Give Us the Information
Monday, February 20th, 2006It isn’t hard to understand why many Americans distrust government officials. Take the recent case of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (”DIA”) stonewalling attempts by the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Peter Hoekstra, to obtain thousands of documents and tape recordings of the Hussein regime:
“WHERE WAS THE NUCLEAR material transported to?” asks an aide to Saddam Hussein, in a taped conversation released last week. He answers his own question: “A number of them were transported out of Iraq.” This provocative snippet is part of 12 hours of taped exchanges between Saddam Hussein and his advisers. The tapes were found in Iraq after the war and were released last week by their American translator. The tapes are authentic. And they are seemingly of little interest to the U.S. government. A spokesman for John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence (DNI), downplayed their importance: “Analysts from the CIA and the DIA reviewed the translations and found that, while fascinating from a historical perspective, the tapes do not reveal anything that changes their postwar analysis of Iraq’s weapons programs.”
The Weekly Standard’s editorial scathingly decries the DCI’s intention to lock up the documents until further notice. What good reason, particularly if the documents are stale, is there that would prevent the DCI handing over the documents to Rep. Hoekstra and in short course thereafter to the American public?
Two reasons come to mind: power and prewar not postwar analysis. First, the DCI is trying to define its turf amongst the different Washington bureaucracies. The DCI and Negroponte want to take credit for any big nugget of information obtained from the tapes or documents. Because much of the information has not been looked at, they want to preserve their bureaucratic stamp on the Hussein documents and recordings before someone else takes their gold medal.
Second, while any post-war analysis in 2006 of Iraq’s weapons capability might not be gleaned from the documents and tapes (the assertion is a bit tenuous because much of the data has not been reviewed), the pre-war analysis is likely to be affected. Why the DCI would rather hide the mere historical information is perplexing–is the DCI an agent of the Hussein regime or of the American people? If the former, then keeping the documents and tapes under lock-and-key is understandable. If the latter, the DCI’s current stance against releasing the Hussein regime information is disgustingly inept.