Justice O’Connor’s retirement (and possibly Rehnquist’s and Steven’s as well!) present a historic opportunity to halt the social and internationalist judicial activism that froths from the court’s current opinion-making.
My beef with Justice O’Connor judical contributions is three-fold: the unconstitutional prolongment of affirmative action policies on the college admissions process; the development of the endorsement test in Establishment Clause cases; the radicalization of social policy, particularly homosexual “rights.” Two of these judicial qualities are recent incarnations, while one (the endorsement test) was O’Connor’s position over the last two decades.
In Grutter v. Bolinger (2003), Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion upheld the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy even though that policy sustantially overvalued an applicant’s race (but only African-American, Latino, and Native-Americans–screw the Asians and the Caucasians). In that opinion, Justice O’Connor said the following:
We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.
In other words, an unconstitutional admissions policy is constitutional for 25 more years because Justice O’Connor gazed into the future and said so–not because the Constitution permitted or warranted the arbitrary extension.
In Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), Justice O’Connor introduced her endorsement test to “clarify” the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. However, all Justice O’Connor did was further muddy the legal waters of permitted religiousity in America. In her view, the government violates the Establishment Clause when to a reasonable or objective observer “the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Also, the purpose of the governmental practice must not “endorse or disapprove of religion.” This endorsement test, based upon her amalgamation of the Court’s Establishment jurisprudence and not on the Founder’s intent of the Establishment Clause’s purpose, is what held together the majority of five justices in the recent case of McCreary County v. ACLU where Justice O’Connor concurred that a courtroom display of the Ten Commandments was unconstitutional:
Given the history of this particular display of the Ten Commandments, the Court correctly finds an Establishment Clause violation. The purpose behind the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer. See Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, page 3 (citations omitted and emphasis mine).
In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), Justice O’Connor joined five other justices in finding a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy unconstitutional. In that opinion, she coughed out the following in her concurrence:
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake. And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior. The Texas sodomy law raise[s] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. (quotations and citations omitted)(emphasis mine).
Justice O’Connor’s personal preference–that States’ cannot morally disapprove of any group’s behavior–is absurd. Her usurpation of the State’s policy interest to grant gay and lesbians reprieve from a criminal law is judical activism at its finest (apart from the fact that the Equal Protection Clause was ratified to rectify racist State practices–not protect any disadvantaged group with whom Justice O’Connor or any judge sympathizes).
These three examples of Justice O’Connor inserting her personal policy preferences in lieu of the constitutional text or deference to state sovereignity are reasons why conservatives should rejoice (as I do) that Justice O’Connor is leaving the Court. President Bush has promised to appoint a strict constructionist (i.e., a judge who will interpret the Constitution and other law according to its orginal intent and meaning) in her place. I believe Bush will keep his promise and appoint a lawyer of a Scalia/Thomas mold. If so, an originalist interpretation of the Establishment Clause is likely to take hold, admission practices that disguise racial quotas with the mantra of diversity less likely to receive the Court’s judicial blessing, and it is less likely that same-sex marriage will be thrust upon our Nation by the Court.