Definitional Chaos
Dale Carpenter’s defense of same-sex marriage over at Volokh has been interesting and informative articulation of that side of the debate. Today, Professor Carpenter attempts to challenge the definitional argument of marriage, i.e., that marriage is the exclusive union of one man and one woman. Frankly, Carpenter’s argument is ensconced in unfavorable realities that one must ignore in defending gay marriage.
Initially, Carpenter obscures the definitional argument:
One of the most common arguments against gay marriage is definitional. This definitional argument against gay marriage generally takes the following form: “Marriage just is the union of one man and one woman. What same-sex couples are asking for is not marriage. So same-sex couples cannot be married.” It offers no normative defense of the definition; it stops there.
Clearly, marriage’s definition limits marriage between one man and one woman. Based on defintion alone, same-sex couples are prohibited from marrying (except in Massachusetts where four black robes wrested marriage’s defintion for the benefit of gays). Carpenter argues that defintionally, there is no normative defense. I disagree. The definition of marriage between one man and one woman is a normative expression. It might not offer an explicit defense within its grammatical constructs, but marriage’s definition implicitly evinces a normative uniqueness (male-female coupling) that merits protection. Moreover, marriage’s definition is an institutional and political defense of traditional marriage. Simply stated, if traditional marriage were not defined within the law, then it could not be protected.
Carpenter slyly insists that because gays and lesbians are challenging marriage’s definition, proponents of traditional marriage cannot hold-up that definition as validating their position or a reason why gays shouldn’t be allowed to marry. Carpenter’s insistence is incorrect and alludes (unintentionally?) why in his conclusion:
Given how logically weak the bare definitional argument is, why does it persist?
The answer, I think, is that behind it is a powerful, unstated intuition that important social institutions ought to have stable attributes (meanings) over time. This is a deeply conservative instinct and I share it to a very large degree.
The “conservative instinct” Carpenter mentions is actually historical fact. Marriage’s definition has been consistent over centuries. That historical consistency is built into marriage’s definition and is one of the reasons why legislators from all 50 States specifically sought to protect and support it by codifying its definition. This historical aspect of marriage is undermined by loosening or casting aside pro-traditional marriage arguments based upon marriage’s definition as conclusory or without normative meaning. American history (including marital history) is something same-sex marriage advocates (and liberals in general) would like the American people to forget.
Carpenter’s definitional disenchantment belies the societal value of traditional marriage and its definition.